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Organising for donor effectiveness:  
An analytical framework for improving aid 
effectiveness policies 
 
By Nilima Gulrajani12 
 
To what extent do donor organisational factors impinge on the search for 
more effective foreign aid?  Donors have lagged behind aid recipients in 
adhering to the principles of aid effectiveness. Explaining the reasons for this 
demands greater awareness of organisational attributes within donor entities.  
Donor organisational features that have a credible positive impact on aid 
effectiveness are identified as the analytical components of donor 
effectiveness.  To date, there have been limited attempts to relate donor 
organisational factors to aid effectiveness goals. This article elaborates on a 
number of such relationships based on an empirical examination of donor 
dynamics in Norway, the UK and Canada.  Organisational features identified 
as contributors to aid effectiveness include a conducive political environment, 
a powerfully mandate ministry of development, a high-level policy statement 
on development and bounded professional discretion. Donor effectiveness 
provides an important lens through which to build a robust post-Busan global 
partnership. 
                                                        
1 Senior researcher, Global Economic Governance Programme, University of Oxford.  Email 
contact: ng-geg@univ.ox.ac.uk 
2 This research has benefited from generous research support provided by the British 
Academy.  I would like to thank Patrick Johnston for extending an invitation to participate in 
a project on Canadian aid effectiveness in conjunction with the Walter and Duncan Gordon 
Foundation that provided the original impetus for this paper. Earlier drafts of this paper 
benefited from comments by participants at a research workshop at the Munk Centre at the 
University of Toronto in May 2010.  The research assistance of Sebastien Dibling, Linnea 
Jonsson, and Caroline Laroche are gratefully acknowledged.   David Black, Alasdair Roberts 
and Donny Surtani all provided valuable guidance. Usual caveats regarding author 
responsibility for quality of content apply. 
 2 
Organising for donor effectiveness:  
An analytical framework for improving aid 
effectiveness policies 
 
By Nilima Gulrajani 
1. Introduction 
 
If the community of foreign aid donors was to ever be a contestant on 
the television game show The Weakest Link, host Anne Robinson would have 
almost certainly had the pleasure of proclaiming: “You are the Weakest Link, 
goodbye.” This is because among all the other actors in the field of foreign 
aid—multilateral institutions, aid recipients, non-governmental agencies, think 
tanks, media observers, consultants and academics among others—there is a 
palpable feeling that donor governments and their publicly-financed donor 
agencies3 that manage Official Development Assistance (ODA) are not pulling 
their weight in the global effort to enhance aid effectiveness. The most recent 
evaluation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness noted donor 
‘unevenness’ in meeting aid effectiveness targets and unmet ‘commitments’ 
to changing donor systems and ways of working (Wood et al., 2011). Donors 
ostensibly lag behind recipients in meeting their obligations “due to lack of 
policy structures, lack of compliance, decisions running contrary to alignment 
and disconnects between corporate strategies and their aid agendas” (Wood, 
June 15 2011).  Nevertheless, the reasons for these donor deficiencies remain 
unspecified and left unexamined in the evaluation report and, for that matter, 
in most discussions of aid effectiveness.   
The 2011 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan did little to 
fill this lacuna on the donor organisational factors limiting advancement of the 
Paris Declaration and its principles and targets.  The Forum concluded that 
                                                        
3 The term ‘donor’ refers to national governments providing foreign aid.  In this paper, we 
empirically examine longstanding bilateral donor organisations that have responsibilities for 
reporting ODA to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).  In larger countries, there 
can be as many as 30 different actors involved as donor organisations (OECD, 2008a: 11). 
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after seven years of implementation, only one of Paris aid effectiveness 
commitments had been reached, and more worryingly, that this had been 
met when the targets were set (Mawdsley et al., forthcoming, Wood et al., 
2011: 19). There was little analysis or discussion of the factors that had 
limited achievement. Instead, aid effectiveness transformed itself into a 
pejorative word.  As of now, there are no concrete commitments to supplant 
the Paris targets, leaving the goals and objectives of aid effectiveness in a 
state of confusion and flux.   
This article aims to refocus the debate on aid effectiveness by closely 
examining the Paris Declaration and its commitments and unmasking the 
silent killers of aid effectiveness lurking inside donor agencies.  In doing so, it 
seeks to build a body of theory and evidence that can support the emerging 
post-Busan agenda for effective development cooperation.  The central tenet 
for this paper is that explanations of aid ineffectiveness must begin their 
search within the donor agency itself, more specifically by examining the 
organisational factors that are plausible influences on the Paris principles and 
targets.  Organisational factors refer to the design attributes relating people, 
things, knowledge and technologies within a formal framework intended to 
achieve specific goals (Clegg et al., 2010). In foreign aid, organisational 
variables have a critical, if sometimes imperceptible, effect on outcomes 
(Tendler, 1975: 2).  For example, the success or failure of policy directives, 
decision-making processes and strategic management systems will always be 
mediated by complex interactions of organisational variables like the 
environment, governance structures, goals and mandates, motivations and 
culture.  Yet, the relation between organisational factors and aid effectiveness 
remains poorly understood in any single donor entity, let along theorized and 
generalized across the donor collective.  This paper attempts to make some 
small steps by building a more robust understanding of the analytical 
components and mechanisms of donor effectiveness.  Donor effectiveness 
refers to the donor-related organisational features that have a credible 
positive impact on aid effectiveness aims, goals that in this paper are defined 
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by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. To date, there has been limited 
systematic discussion of either the components of donor effectiveness or, 
indeed, the possible causal relations by which donor effectiveness might 
impinge on Paris commitments. While there are a number of DAC documents 
that act as compilations of internal donor management practices, none offer 
analytical statements on the relation between specific donor organisational 
variables and aid effectiveness (OECD, 2008a, OECD, 2009a, OECD, 2005).4   
In order to begin an exploration of this relationship, the paper 
proceeds as follows.  The contemporary policy context for aid effectiveness is 
presented in the next section.  It is suggested that a myopic focus on the 
technical modalities of aid delivery has come at the expense of understanding 
the organisational dynamics that determine whether such modalities can 
actually deliver desired outcomes. Deeper questions of donor effectiveness 
have been sidelined in favour of quantitative rankings of donor performance 
constructed using global data on aid delivery mechanisms.  This constrained 
efficiency-driven understanding of donor performance is, however, 
unwarranted given the widespread investigation of donor organisational 
dynamics within the social sciences.  The literature review in section three 
points to four organisational variables that shape donor behavior and 
comprise the framework for donor effectiveness: political environments, 
donor governance, organisational goals and discretion incentives.   Section 
four utilises these categories to empirically compare and contrast donor 
dynamics in Canada, the UK and Norway and illustrate the plausible 
mechanisms by which organisational factors can be linked to the achievement 
of donor obligations within the Paris Declaration. The paper concludes by 
recommending that research and policy agendas orient themselves towards 
the cultivation of donor effectiveness.  Advancing the principles of effective 
development cooperation to which both Northern and Southern donors have 
                                                        
4 This is perhaps due to the political sensitivities in singling out good and poor performance 
among DAC members.  
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committed to in Busan requires greater grasp of the inter-relations between 
donor organisation and aid effectiveness.   
2. Unpacking aid effectiveness 
 
Aid effectiveness is now an integral part of the development lexicon, a 
term that represents a package of specific ideas and reform measures on how 
aid can be better managed (Hayman, 2009). For many, the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness (2005) has become the authoritative definition of aid 
effectiveness (Stern et al., 2008: 20).  The Declaration, and its successor, the 
Accra Agenda for Action (2008), defined aid effectiveness in terms of five 
major principles meant to bind donors and recipients into specific time-limited 
commitments.  35 bilateral donors, 26 multilaterals, 56 aid recipients and 14 
civil society organisations subscribed to these much-publicized commitments.  
Target categories included: (1) aid recipients exercising leadership over 
development policies and strategies and leading co-ordination (ownership); 
(2) donors basing their support on recipients’ systems and priorities 
(alignment); (3) reducing the transaction costs of donor interventions 
(harmonisation); (4) introducing performance measurement and management 
mechanisms (results-based management); and (5) ensuring commitment and 
respect between donors and recipients (mutual accountability).  The Busan 
Partnership Document (2011) sought to widen the application and meaning of 
aid effectiveness but did so with little agreement on what was to follow in its 
footsteps (Eyben, 2012, Mawdsley et al., forthcoming).  Table 1 presents the 
formal commitments and explicit targets that donor members of the DAC 
made to the achievement of the Paris Declaration (PD) in 2005.5  The PD 
marked a significant departure from pervious eras because donors had never 
been held to specific, time-bound commitments in their aid operations (Stern 
et al., 2008: 12).  As there were no formal measurable commitments made by 
donors at the Busan Summit however, the PD is taken as the only globally 
                                                        
5 Southern donors are not referenced in the Paris Declaration. They attended the 2005 Paris 
meeting as aid-recipients and are therefore not bound by the same obligations as ‘traditional’ 
DAC donors. 
 6 
accepted framework for concretely assessing donor progress towards aid 
effectiveness.  From Table 1, a number of observations can be made about 
the ways donors are implicated in the global aid effectiveness agenda.     
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
First, the PD commitments and targets largely focus on aid 
modalities that are assumed but not proven to deliver better 
development outcomes. Joint donor missions, collaborative analytical 
work, programme-based delivery mechanisms, publicly accessible and 
transparent information, and integrated project units are all references to the 
ways aid is planned, packaged, budgeted and delivered to recipients.6  The 
global aid effectiveness discourse thus appears focused on the quality and 
desired characteristics of aid inputs rather than the likelihood that aid 
delivered in these formats will achieve results. A 2008 study by the OECD 
confirmed that the Paris targets lacked explanatory power for development 
results and were mainly operationally and procedurally focused.  At the same 
time, it also indicated that “there is evidence that aid, when delivered in ways 
consistent with the Paris Declaration can improve the way aid is managed and 
delivered” (Stern et al., 2008: viii, 15-16).  The Paris Declaration thus largely 
has the “expectation of results” even if the “pathways to change remain 
under-specified.”  Global aid effectiveness discourse thus remains defined by 
the operational goals and success of aid interventions, rather than by broader 
development progress and material improvement in the quality of life for aid 
beneficiaries.   
Secondly, the aid effectiveness targets concentrate 
disproportionately on aid efficiency as an operational goal (Stern et 
al., 2008: 20).   The donor targets seek to mainly minimize transaction costs 
of aid by reducing duplication, improving coordination, ensuring timely 
                                                        
6 Although attempts were made at Busan to widen the range of non-aid modalities 
contributing to development by moving away from the term aid effectiveness to the term 
development effectiveness, no consensus on the meaning and definition of this term emerged 
(Eyben, 2012, Mawdsley et al., forthcoming).    
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actions, and ensuring coherence both amongst donors and across the donors-
aid recipient relation.    While these are valuable goals in many 
circumstances, they are not always so if they come at the expense of other 
important policy goals.   The contemporary aid effectiveness agenda makes 
strong assumptions that traditional donor public administration systems are 
inherently poor performance systems requiring greater efficiency to be 
functionally superior.  This occurs without examination of donor dynamics and 
measurement of efficiency losses and potential gains to be had (Gulrajani, 
2011). Efficiency travels as a powerful corporate metaphor of unquestioned 
administrative good in aid management, a managerial value that takes pride 
of place in reform agendas (Gulrajani, 2010a).  Nevertheless, aid efficiency 
can only be a vehicle to higher aid performance to the extent that it allows for 
higher levels of satisfaction of prioritized needs.  For example, valuable 
efficiency savings may occur if recouped funds are ploughed back into overall 
aid budgets, or used to fund more highly prioritized activities. To the extent 
that managerialism privileges the value of efficiency without identifying the 
alternative expenditures to be funded by cost savings, the pursuit of 
efficiency can only be understood as blind emulation of bottom-line business 
practices.  
 
Thirdly, efficient technical systems in aid management are seen as 
objective tools external to a donor agency rather than vehicles that 
can alter the internal environments within which these tools may be 
more or less successful. There is limited recognition of the social and political 
consequences of aid management systems, for example, when performance 
management systems alter intra-organisational political relations in ways 
inimical to the delivery of results (Hirschmann, 2002).  What seems to be 
missing is an understanding of how donors’ own organisation mediates the 
implementation of aid and the way technical aid systems in turn influence 
organisational contexts.  This omission may explain why global aid 
effectiveness targets have yet to be strongly linked to improved development 
outcomes.   
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Lastly, even where organisational variables are identified as critical for 
global aid effectiveness, as for example within the harmonization principles 
where staff incentives in recruitment, appraisal and training are identified as 
areas of donor commitment, there is no deeper discussion of the 
specific formats these should take based on evidence from donor 
agencies.  For example, should incentives be positive or punitive? In what 
spheres of activity should they be enacted? To what extent might formal 
incentive structures crowd out intrinsic staff motivations to perform?  Perhaps 
as a result of such unanswered questions, there is difficulty in agreeing on 
universal indicators that will assess progress on all the global aid effectiveness 
principles (the mutual accountability, managing for results and ownership 
principles all lack donor targets in the PD).   Consequently, the benchmarking 
of donor performance heavily relies on the creation of indexes constructed 
using limited notions of aid effectiveness as presented within the PD (Easterly 
and Pfutze, 2008, Williamson, 2010, Roodman, 2006, Knack et al., 2010, 
Kharas, 2010, Knack et al., 2011, Easterly and Williamson, 2011). Donor 
performance in most of these rankings is proxied by a composite index of 
variables that include aid selectivity, harmonization, alignment, transparency 
and overhead costs.  While these rankings can certainly motivate donors to 
consider their own practices more carefully, they are also making implicit 
assumptions about the drivers of donor improvement.  Quantitative indexes 
of donor performance thus suffer from the same weaknesses as the global aid 
effectiveness discourse by leaving relatively unexplored the ways donor 
organisational variables intervene to generate variations in effectiveness.    
Consideration of donor effectiveness can go some way to alleviate 
these weaknesses.  Exploring the organisational features within donor 
agencies and the causal mechanisms that link them to the Paris commitments 
can instigate greater focus on second-generation pathways through which 
development results are potentially achieved.  It can also encourage re-
consideration of efficiency as the main driver of aid effectiveness, explore the 
limitations of technical solutions and demand greater specificity in proposed 
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solutions.   Ultimately, the search for effective aid ignores a potentially 
valuable driver of improvement if it downplays the influence of donor 
organisational dynamics.  
3. The organisational components of donor effectiveness 
 
The study of donor organisational behavior is not without precedent.   
Nevertheless, teasing out the relation between donor organisational attributes 
and aid effectiveness has not always been the purpose of research 
investigations.  Moreover, while researchers may have had a common interest 
in the organisational forces that influence donor behaviour, each social 
science disciplines has concentrated on distinct variables.  This section 
reviews four key organisational dimensions of donor behaviour—environment, 
governance, goals and discretion incentives (Table 2).  These components 
provide the conceptual backbone for the concept of donor effectiveness.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
International Political Economy and the political environment 
 
Constructive approaches in international relations adopt an explanation 
of donor behaviour deriving from a varied and somewhat uneven combination 
of global ideas about development and national state interests.  Global norms 
structure the behavior of donor agencies embedded in their national domestic 
polities due to the desire for global legitimacy (Weaver, 2008, Boas and 
McNeill, 2004, Finnemore, 1997). Thus, the increased number of bilateral aid 
agencies in Southern states can be explained by the desire to conform to 
global norms of international cooperation in order to demonstrate their 
advancement as legitimate global actors.  Becoming a donor is a powerful 
symbol of national progress that fuels the expansion of Southern donors.  At 
the same time, global norms do not completely construct the behavior of 
donors, otherwise donor behaviours would converge to an identical template 
for aid-giving.   As Lancaster explains in her comparison of five foreign aid 
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donors, such convergence is more theoretical than empirically grounded.  
Rather, differences in donor policy choices can be explained by the way the 
global imperative for wealthier countries to give aid to poorer ones intersects 
with narrower domestic political concerns (Lancaster, 2007: 7-9).  In other 
words, domestic politics and processes mediate the influence of global ideas 
and become an important determinant of donor conduct.  This argument is 
refined in recent research that suggests it is only those international norms 
that are congruent with national motives for aid-giving that will influence 
outcomes (Maurits van der Veen, 2011). International political economy 
theorists focus their analysis on the manner in which global dynamics strongly 
influence, without completely determining, donor organisational behaviour. 
Donor organisations are embedded in intersecting domestic and global 
environments that are dually negotiated in all decisions and actions.  Political 
environments thus become a critical determinant on aid effectiveness. 
 
Neo institutional economics and donor governance 
 
Neo institutional economics borrows from rational public choice theory 
and Coasian theory of the firm to suggest that bilateral donors are involved in 
multiple principal-agent problems across the transnational spaces of 
development (Gibson et al., 2005: 64, Martens, 2005).  Principals enter 
agents into contracts to achieve goals they cannot achieve themselves.  While 
the bilateral donor agency is in some cases a principal, for example to 
contractors and consultants hired to implement development projects, it can 
also be an agent for national taxpayers and their legislative representatives.  
The latter agents provide funding to the donor agency to carry out 
development activities in line with their political priorities.  Donor behaviour is 
largely driven by relative cost-benefit calculations that occur within these 
nested principal-agent relations.  Donors are free to decide these costs and 
benefits, although it is assumed they do so rationally in order to maximize 
expected utility derived from their behaviour.  
 
 11 
Nonetheless, it is the broken feedback loops between donor agents 
and aid recipient principals that is one of the most distinctive and important 
aspects of the aid delivery chain.  This is because “the people for whose 
benefit aid agencies work are not the same as those from whom their 
revenues are obtained; they actually live in different countries and different 
political constituencies” (Martens, 2002: 14).  Bilateral donor behaviours will 
be oriented upwards towards their own national constituencies because the 
domestic voting cycle acts as a powerful incentive for accountability in this 
direction.  Conversely, a cost-benefit analysis by the donor would not easily 
support downward accountability towards aid recipients located in other 
countries given the lack of a formal sanction mechanism across jurisdictions 
(Easterly, 2006: 168-169).  The ultimate principal for the donor agency thus 
remains its domestic publics and these must ultimately be satisfied, even if 
they are worst placed to monitor geographically dispersed development work.  
National structures are established to keep governments informed of the 
donor organisation’s achievements as well as maintain support for their work 
(Gibson et al., 2005: 134-5).  These donor governance structures are the 
formal institutional arrangements that ensure that donor agencies are acting 
in line with their principals located in the donor nation. Donor governance 
structures comprise the rules and regulations that outline the scope, rules and 
responsibilities of the donor agency vis a vis national actors with interests in 
managing aid resources and development policy. These principals generally 
include the executive and legislative branches of government as well as 
bureaucratic actors like Ministries of Finance and Ministries of Foreign Affairs.  
If aid effectiveness demands accountability to principals in poor countries as 
most now accept, then this can only be secured within bilateral donor 
governance systems that can also meet the demands of donor principals.   
The sociology of organisational goals 
 
Organisational sociologists have pointed to the ambiguous mandates of 
donor agencies that are the result of contradictory pressures emerging from 
their environments (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, Townley, 1997). In complex 
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environments with a plurality of stakeholders, organisational legitimacy is 
derived from multiple sources and actors.  Maintaining legitimacy at each site 
provides organisations with resources, power, membership and public 
approval that ensures they continue to exist and thrive.  The behaviour of 
individual donor agencies is structured by this need for legitimacy from 
multiple quarters.  Ambiguous mandates are symptomatic of organisational 
imperatives to symbolically maintain the favour of all constituents.  In this 
way, mandates cannot be viewed as cognitively rational or objective 
statements on official policies, missions and goals (Babb, 2003: 5).  Policy 
documents, while somewhat durable features of organizational life, tend to be 
interpretable in multiple and contradictory ways.   The more constituents 
there are, the greater plurality of interpretations that exist and the wider 
spectrum of actions that are made possible.  The result is some amount of 
inadvertent slippage from core goals.   
 
Widely heralded donor goals like poverty reduction and aid 
effectiveness are often vulnerable to subordination by unstated, 
countervailing pressures on an aid programme.  Using aid effectiveness as an 
example, securing national “ownership” of a programme can be inimical to 
the desire for “results” in situations of poor governance (Craig and Porter, 
2006).  The contradictions between development policy goals like poverty 
reduction, neo-liberal economic policies and neo-conservative foreign policy 
might also contribute to significant slippage (Cooke, 2003, Murphy, 2008). 
Donor nations have naturally glossed over such inconsistencies with the use 
of diplomatic buzzwords, unrealistic policies and a proliferation of new 
strategies and solutions, all in their bid to maintain support and legitimacy 
from multiple quarters (Cornwall and Brock, 2005, Quarles van Ufford, 1988).  
Unpacking these tensions and framing statements of purpose that openly 
acknowledge tensions and seek to transcend paradoxes can go some way to 
making aid effectiveness a more realizable goal.  
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Ethnographic approaches and incentives for discretion 
 
Anthropologists with interests in foreign aid treat the people, policies 
and organisations of international development as ethnographic objects in 
and of themselves (Mosse, 2005: 11-12, Mosse and Lewis, 2005, Mosse, 
2011).   Development anthropology requires an “actor-orientation” that 
underlines the responses and lived experiences of individuals involved and 
affected by wider development processes (Long and Long, 1992, Lewis et al., 
2003).  In the local organisational spaces of the donor agency, aid-worker 
elites are both agents and objects of contradictory policies and goals.  These 
workers have the capability for autonomous behaviour from rigid institutional 
diktats as they broker and translate policies, roles, relationships and 
representations into tangible and meaningful actions.  This autonomy is partly 
a product of the inherent opportunities for discretion in the complex, diffuse, 
global realm of development policy work (Weisband and Ebrahim, 2007).   
 
And yet, the aid worker is often implicitly stripped of his discretion to 
operate in the uncertain environments of foreign aid.  Donor pressures to 
appear infallible and always in possession of the solution to the problems of 
poverty reduction ultimately limits opportunities to make mistakes, to learn 
and to critically reflect on their own situation (Ferguson, 1994, Eyben, 2003, 
Jassey, 2004).  However, the search for donor innovation and learning 
emerges by entertaining uncertainty in situations of complexity, responding to 
the beneficiary with as much flexibility as possible, extrapolating lessons from 
past failures by talking truth to power and considering her difficult position as 
a cosmopolitan elite working on behalf of the world’s poor.  This requires a 
permissive cultural environment where shorter-term risks can be sustained for 
the potential benefits of longer-term rewards in the fight against poverty, in 
other words where organisations are allowed to “grope along” by straying 
from conventional orthodoxies without complete certainty of the results that 
can emerge (Behn, 2007, Lindblom, 1959).  At the same time, it is fair to say 
that unbounded discretion does generate high levels of unpredictability and 
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uncertainty in organisational processes, potentially reducing elite 
accountability and limiting organisational focus and responsiveness.  Strategic 
consideration of desired levels of autonomy and rule-following in donor 
agencies therefore needs to examine existing incentives for professional 
discretion.  
 
 
There is clearly a vast literature on organisational attributes in donor 
agencies that can inform the concept of donor effectiveness.  Using these 
four organisational factors as an analytical starting point—environments, 
governance, goals and discretion incentives—the rest of the paper 
demonstrates how each of these variables can be plausibly linked to Paris aid 
effectiveness goals using comparative evidence from the Canadian, British 
and Norwegian cases.  Establishing a causal relation between donor 
organisational attributes and aid effectiveness is not without its difficulties, 
particularly given the complex nature of interactions across all four variables.  
Furthermore, aggregating donor contributions to aid effectiveness ultimately 
suffers from the same difficulties establishing the drivers of performance in 
the corporate, public and non-profit sectors (de Bruijn, 2007, Harford and 
Klein, 2004, Moynihan, 2008, Radin, 2006, Townley, 1997, March and Sutton, 
1997).  There is ultimately no robust way to causally attribute individual 
donor behaviour to aid effectiveness except in small project-related activities 
using randomized controlled evaluations.7  Given there is limited ability to use 
quasi-experimental methods to falsify the relation between donor organisation 
and aid effectiveness however, qualitative analysis of donor dynamics can 
begin to distill relationships by which donor organisational features plausibly 
and validly influence the achievement of aid effectiveness goals as defined by 
the PD.  Here, comparative case study research in the tradition of public 
administration and management offer a valuable method.  Cases are 
constructed using secondary literatures and in-depth semi-structured episodic 
                                                        
7 Yet, even in the case of randomized controlled evaluations, the nature of the causal 
mechanism remains elusive. See (Deaton, 2010) 
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interviews (Flick, 2000, Flick, 2002). Drafts were circulated to interviewees for 
further validation and refinement of the proposed narratives.  Through 
iterative examination, conceivable relationships emerged concerning the ways 
donor organisational attributes advance the cause of aid effectiveness. These 
potential causal mechanisms are non-exhaustive and are offered to illustrate 
the value of the concept of donor effectiveness.  While establishing the 
robustness of these relationships may require additional investigations, at 
minimum they indicate potential causal pathways by which donor 
organisational behavior influences the achievement of aid effectiveness goals.  
4. Mechanisms of donor effectiveness: comparing the 
evidence 
 
If our literature review points to the relevance of environments, 
governance, goals and professional discretion as components of donor 
effectiveness, understanding the mechanisms by which these may enhance 
aid effectiveness is the next line of enquiry.   This section aims to foster 
greater understanding of the causal mechanisms of donor effectiveness by 
examining organizational dynamics in Canadian, Norwegian and British donor 
systems.  These cases were selected as they represent both similarity and 
divergence in donor performance.  Norway and Britain tend to be top 
performers, in direct contrast to Canada (Easterly and Pfutze, 2008, Knack et 
al., 2011).  Examining these cases allows for comparisons of organisational 
attributes across bilateral donor agencies deemed high performers, as well as 
across donors assessed as having large differences in performance.  The 
analysis provides the basis for some plausible mechanisms of donor 
effectiveness across the four organisational categories. Each is discussed 
below in relation to case narratives.  
Political environments 
Political commitment is a causal mechanism for aid effectiveness. 
 
The Canadian, Norwegian and UK cases suggest political champions for 
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aid emerge from domestic political dynamics appropriately intersecting with 
international policy demands, and that variance in leadership commitment can 
be linked to variance in the achievement of aid effectiveness goals.     
Global and domestic policy environments aligned in a manner 
conducive to the creation of a strong political champion for development in 
the UK.  Prior to 1997, the Overseas Development Administration in the UK 
existed as a branch of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office without a senior 
figure at its helm.  In the run-up to the 1997 general election, the Labour 
shadow foreign secretary, Robin Cook, recommended the creation of a 
separate government department responsible for international development 
with a Cabinet position dedicated to this portfolio.  The choice of Clare Short 
as Shadow spokesperson for Overseas Development and as future Secretary 
of State was not obvious given she had more interest and experience in 
domestic policy issues, having occupied the position of Shadow Transport 
Secretary only a few months prior to Labour’s election win.  It also merits 
considering that Short represented the left wing of the Labour Party base and 
domestic political imperatives dictated that Party leader Tony Blair could not 
ignore this segment of the party when drawing up his Cabinet. The creation 
of a Cabinet level position for international development can thus be viewed 
as both a pragmatic and politically expedient response to placate an 
important domestic constituency without threatening the central tenets of a 
New Labour agenda.   
While Short’s personality and seniority in the Labour Party are often 
attributed as important determinants of DFID’s early successes, there is 
perhaps too little discussion of the global environment governing the times 
that fostered her political commitments to development. At the time of her 
appointment, the search for new models for international development policy 
had begun in earnest as Washington consensus based policies lost their lustre 
(Development Assistance Committee, 1996, World Bank, 1997, Gore, 2000).  
The proposal to create DFID reflected a growing global norm that aid should 
focus on poverty alleviation rather than strategic national interests (Barder, 
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2005).    Cook’s vision was backed by strong support for a new approach to 
development by Prime Minister Tony Blair and Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Gordon Brown. It was then up to Clare Short to capitalize on this propitious 
conjunction of domestic and international imperatives.  As Short’s 
international profile as a committed development leader enhanced, so too did 
her domestic political capital grow.   
Dynamics in domestic and global environments also positively 
reinforced political commitments for development in Norway, although 
perhaps to a lesser degree than the UK.  In outward-looking Norway, strong 
political stewardship on global development is ultimately good domestic 
politics.  As a result, politicians of all stripes aim to positively claim leadership 
on development issues t both levels whenever possible.  This was particularly 
notable before 2004 when the Minister of International Development jointly 
presided over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) with the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, yet had little control over the development programme that 
was overseen by a separate directorate, the Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation (NORAD). This essentially left the Minister of 
Development without an organisation to minister over.  In 2004, with the 
desire to contribute to the global discourse on poverty reduction, 
Development Minister Hilde Frafjord Johnson reduced NORAD’s role in 
development by centralising strategic development policy responsibilities 
within the MFA.  Just as in the UK, demand from the highest levels for a new 
global development paradigm allied with domestic political interests of the 
day and sustained strong commitments to aid agendas.  In both cases, this 
common sponsorship advanced Paris principles like donor harmonization and 
alignment via new donor fora like the Like-Minded Donor Group and the 
Utstein Group.   
The Canadian case demonstrates plainly that the DAC prescription that 
assumes better leadership emerges when development is the responsibility of 
a senior minister (OECD, 2008a: 10) does not differentiate between 
possessing a leadership role and exhibiting a political commitment.  Counter 
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intuitively perhaps, the existence of a separate ministerial position to oversee 
the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has not cultivated 
strong political commitments to the global aid agenda. CIDA has had separate 
status from the foreign affairs ministry since its creation in 1968, with a 
Minister in Cabinet since 1996 (Morrison, 1998: 63).   Notwithstanding, over 
the last fifteen years the common weakness identified in Canada’s foreign aid 
programme has been the lack of political commitment to the international 
aims of aid and development.  At some level this may be a feature of a 
governance structure that still requires the Minister for International 
Development to be accountable to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
Nevertheless, this is more a de jure stipulation that dates since the creation of 
CIDA and does not reflect the minister’s lack of status in Cabinet.  To 
illustrate, the development minister manages the largest pool of development 
finance in the International Assistance Envelope (IAE), sits on the Foreign 
Affairs and Defence Committee as well as the National Security Committee.  
Notwithstanding a strong leadership structure, the country has cycled through 
eight relatively junior and inexperienced Ministers of International 
Development under both majority and minority governments the last fifteen 
years, a reflection of the lack of political capital this portfolio possesses.  The 
previous minister, Bev Oda, while the country’s longest serving development 
minister, is also acknowledged as the weakest leader of CIDA to date.  She 
alienated civil society actors with opaque and politically motivated decision-
making, centralized power among a close coterie of senior officials and 
generally demoralized CIDA staff and Canadian development stakeholders 
alike.  This weak domestic leadership minimized Canada’s championship of 
global aid effectiveness.  This may explain the “struggle” that the OECD 
suggests Canada had in putting its discursive commitments to the Paris 
Declaration into practice (OECD, 2012: 69).  Technical implementation is 
mediated by a domestic political context that legitimizes the parochial 
exploitation of foreign aid to service domestic ethnic, corporate, geopolitical, 
regional and linguistic interests and underserves global commitments to aid 
effectiveness. Even with a Cabinet position for international development, this 
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weak political leadership undermines Canada’s ambitions to achieve the goals 
of aid effectiveness.   
Donor governance 
A powerfully mandated ministry of development that integrates both 
development policy and aid administration functions can improve aid 
effectiveness. 
 
Donor governance structures comprise the rules and regulations that 
outline the scope of responsibilities of the donor body vis a vis other national 
governmental actors with interests in managing aid resources and 
development policy. The cases of Norway, Canada and the UK all point to the 
value of integrating development policy-making and aid administration into a 
development ministry with the powers to arbitrate the demands of other 
national governmental bodies interested in the international cooperation 
agenda.  A ministry with powers of arbitration and authority over 
development policy setting and aid’s administrative execution can ensure 
upward accountability to taxpayers without sacrificing downward 
accountability to beneficiaries. 
 Integration is, by definition, not possible in a specialized arms length 
agency as this kind of governance structure lies outside the realm of 
government policy-making. 8   Ministries therefore remain the structure of 
choice for the governmental development function.  Typically the spectrum of 
choice lies between, on the one hand a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where aid 
is a foreign policy concern alongside others and a Ministry of Development 
with authority over international prosperity and well-being as a broad-based 
goal (OECD, 2009a). DAC has suggested that the choice between these 
structures does not matter for effectiveness (OECD, 2008a: 11).   
Nevertheless, these cases suggest that within a foreign affairs ministry, there 
is greater risk that development aims are subordinated to foreign policy ones 
                                                        
8 Currently, no donor government exclusively organises its development programme as an 
arms length agency.  Where separate development agencies exist as in Sweden and France, 
their functions are typically delimited to aid implementation, and possess little, if any, power 
to set agendas, convene stakeholders and advocate policy positions (OECD, 2008a: 11).     
 20 
because the latter seeks to further national interests on the global stage.  
Notwithstanding the widespread language of complementarity and mutual 
benefit that foreign policy realists use, aid altruists suggest rationales for aid-
giving often do often contradict with major foreign policy goals (Black, 2007, 
Pratt, 2000).   A strong development ministry is better placed to give more 
measured consideration of all of the policy spheres and governmental 
principals with a stake in development, without foregoing aid’s humanitarian 
imperatives and commitment to beneficiary welfare.   In other words, donor 
governance structures that entrust a development ministry with robust 
authorities for policy setting and execution are better able to protect the 
global public good aspects of aid effectiveness. 
An integrated model of donor governance exists in Norway where the 
MFA holds overall responsibility for both development policy and its execution.  
The MFA controls 85% of ODA and its embassies have responsibility for the 
implementation of development policy. Specialized directorate NORAD 
provides technical advisory services, quality assurance and NGO grant 
financing and evaluation services.  Interviewees outside the MFA felt that 
integration within the MFA had constrained Norway’s ability to sustainably 
champion aid policies that do not mainly advance nationalistic, commercial or 
geopolitical interests. These observers suggested aid has increasingly become 
a vehicle to cultivate Norwegian soft power, advance its policies in NATO and 
its interests in the Arctic, secure commercial contracts in Angola and acquire 
influence in multilateral institutions.  Nevertheless, a rising aid budget in 
Norway had permitted the parallel co-existence of aid effectiveness and 
national foreign policy goals to date, for example by maintaining and even 
exceeding its commitment to the 0.7% ODA/GNI target, remaining a leader 
on untying its aid and continuing to use country procurement and financial 
systems (OECD, 2008b:57, OECD, 2011).  The expansion of the aid agenda to 
service both geopolitical and humanitarian impulses has, however, resulted in 
operational dispersion within the MFA, rising administrative burdens and 
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accusations that Norwegian aid suffers from hypocritical “doublethink” (Curtis, 
2010).   
Similarly high levels of integration between policymaking and 
administration exist in the UK where DFID is responsible for both functions.  
Unlike Norway however, these functions are centralized in a development 
ministry that has wielded considerable authority to defend aid within foreign 
policy circles.  The separation of DFID from the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) in 1997 came with substantial authorities for DFID to steer 
development policy and aid implementation within a whole-of-government 
framework (Lockwood et al., 2010). Strong political commitments for 
development reinforced effective physical separation from the FCO and 
permitted open negotiations between competing rationales for aid in plain full 
view of the Cabinet (Shafik, 2006). The integration of policy and 
administrative functions in DFID has strengthened commitments to aid 
effectiveness commitments across government; for example, DFID took the 
lead in training staff from other government departments in aid effectiveness 
issues and was granted permission to decentralize financial authorities and 
commit to 10-year partnership arrangements with aid recipients to support 
country support and donor harmonization (OECD, 2010: 72-2). DFID retains 
an “unambiguous relationship” with other ministries, giving it greater 
influence on “cross-government thinking on development policy” (OECD, 
2008a: 5).   
In contrast, Canadian development policy is set by three governmental 
entities: CIDA, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
(DFAIT) and the Ministry of Finance. 9  All these units are linked via the 
International Assistance Envelope (IAE) that is the main planning mechanism 
                                                        
9 Aid also involves secondary partners like the Department of National Defense, Health 
Canada, the International Development Research Centre and Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada.    
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for distributing aid resources to federal government entities. 10   CIDA, 
however, does not command the same level of authority over development 
policy that either Norway’s MFA or the UK’s DFID do. As Canada’s recent peer 
review puts it: “CIDA is responsible for facilitating policy coherence for 
development across the Canadian government, but it does not appear to have 
a strong enough mandate or leverage for achieving this aim, nor has it put in 
place sufficient competent in-house capacity for this responsibility” (OECD, 
2012: 38). Perhaps as a result, Canada has struggled to remain achieve some 
of the Paris targets that require greater flexibility from fiscal rules set by other 
governmental actors.  This includes reporting its funds on government 
budgets, participating in joint missions, minimizing parallel implementation 
structures and ensuring greater predictability of funding (OECD, 2011: 170, 
OECD, 2012: 75).  Canadian aid is more susceptible to the vagaries of other 
government actors that seek to advance domestic policy priority concerns first 
and foremost.  Physical separation as a development ministry has not 
guarded against this intrusion, perhaps because CIDA’s governance structure 
still formally subordinates its mandate to DFAIT (Morrison, 1998: 63).  
Without a strong voice in government, aid effectiveness is not mainstreamed 
across the spectrum of government actors with influence over CIDA’s ability 
to implement its aid effectively (OECD, 2012).  
Organisational goals 
A high-level statement that is clear and unambiguous on the purpose of 
development can enhance aid effectiveness. 
 
Bilateral donor goals are often articulated in White Papers or legislative 
mandates.  A legislative mandate provides legal authorities for public 
expenditure that are defined and approved by a legislative body like 
Parliament, whereas a White Paper provides strategic direction but is not 
legally binding or a basis for future legislation.   High-level statements such as 
these anchor development policy into a framework for government, especially 
                                                        
10 Note not all IAE funds qualify as ODA, and moreover some Canadian ODA is not funded 
through the IAE. 
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when stripped of ambiguity (OECD, 2008a: 5).  Nevertheless, as previously 
mentioned, the need for legitimacy from multiple quarters can lead to 
contradictory aims and a certain amount of slippage from core goals.  
Canada’s legislative mandate appears more vulnerable to such weaknesses 
than the UK, whereas Norway’s White Paper is also susceptible to 
contradictions and tensions.    
The (2002) International Development Act formalized DFID’s political 
commitment to activities that further the aim of poverty reduction, a clear 
end goal for aid effectiveness.  The UK act seals into law the mission of 
poverty reduction as the legal frame of reference for DFID’s work, the 
standard against which Parliament adjudicates the Department’s 
performance.  While the Act does not explicitly forbid the tying of aid or aid 
that furthers foreign policy, trade or national security concerns, all aid must at 
least have a “likely” impact on poverty.  This ensures that competing foreign 
policy priorities cannot overwhelm the development agenda (Burall,White & 
Blick, 2009: 16-17, 21, 25; Lockwood et al., 2010: 69). The Act is also 
unequivocal in its coverage (all of DFID’s work) and provides a strong cultural 
orientation for the Department.  The wording of the UK Act buffers DFID from 
pressures in government to dilute its development objectives and provides a 
strong framework for downstream aid management in line with the Paris 
principles. 
In contrast, Canada’s ODA Accountability Act (2008) only applies to 
development spending that qualifies as ODA or relates to natural disasters, 
exempting non-ODA spending within the IAE.  Not all of CIDA’s activities can 
be classified within the definition of ODA, in contrast to the UK where the Act 
(2002) covers all DFID’s work. At the same time, the Canadian Accountability 
Act includes ODA expenditures by actors other than CIDA and thus does not 
cultivate the same sense of purpose for the department that it does for DFID.  
In the UK Act, aid must have the purpose of poverty reduction.  The Canadian 
Accountability Act (2008), however, requires that aid has the purpose of 
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poverty reduction and be provided in a “manner that is consistent with 
Canadian values, Canadian foreign policy, the principles of the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of March 2, 2005, sustainable development 
and democracy promotion and that promotes international human rights 
standards.” The Canadian Act thus legally requires ODA to be much more 
than simply poverty focused while tensions between these various aims are 
left unexamined.  In contrast, the UK Act does not stipulate any 
supplementary conditions on aid spending in line with national values, foreign 
policy priorities or democratic principles.  In Canada, the Act is little more 
than a ‘box ticking exercise’ (Morton, 2009), where multiple ticks are 
permissible and undermine the value of the legislative mandate itself. 
Norway’s development policy is not underpinned by any specific piece 
of legislation as in the UK or Canada, but is the result of the government’s 
policy platform, its addresses to the Storting and published White Papers 
(OECD, 2008b: 20).  Norway’s most recent White Paper (2009) is impressive 
and ambitious in its scope (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norway, 2009).  And 
yet, it has paid lip service to some of the contradictions between its 
development aims and the reality of its other foreign policy aims, including 
the operations of its oil industry, its growing arms industry, and the 
investments of its Pension Fund (Curtis, 2010).  Notwithstanding a 
commitment to policy coherence, unstated tensions and possibilities for 
slippage abound in ways that can undermine commitments to the goals of aid 
effectiveness, particularly that of mutual accountability for development 
results.  The lack of strategic prioritization that characterizes the development 
and foreign policy planning apparatus has left Norway pursuing a single clear 
aim according to one prominent think tank, namely furthering its public 
legitimacy (de Coning et al., 2010).   
Discretion incentives 
Bounded professional discretion can improve aid effectiveness.    
 
There is evidence that the exercise of discretion by public sector staff 
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closest to problems can result in more appropriate policy, effective practical 
solutions and greater public accountability (Lipsky, 1980, Elmore, 1979, Hupe, 
2008, Hupe and Hill, 2007).   It may also be a way to retain talented staff 
who value autonomy and room for creativity and experimentation.  
Nevertheless, all of these cases highlight the importance of professional 
discretion for aid effectiveness where this autonomy is exercised within clear 
boundaries rather than indiscriminately permitted.    
Within DFID, discretion occurs within the framework of an 
unambiguous legislated purpose (poverty reduction) and a clear and coherent 
performance assessment system.  This makes the bounds of the risk/reward 
tradeoff clear, as the risks of professional autonomy must warrant the 
possibility of better aid outcomes. The UK has used common sense (rather 
than demanding outright altered regulations with the Treasury or the National 
Audit Office) to define what constitutes reasonable risks compatible with 
discretion. In turn, the UK political structure has been willing to apply rules 
and regulations with greater exceptionalism vis-a-vis DFID,11 perhaps 
recognizing that development policy does not hold the identical claims of 
accountability of other departments given the Department must also consider 
the claims of beneficiaries external to UK jurisdictions. Discretion becomes 
less about accommodating everyone on everything and more about exercising 
the right to choose actions selectively with knowledge of the appropriate 
limits to this right.  Aid interventions can be flexible enough to accommodate 
the fluid processes of development while still ensuring accountability and 
responsible resource use. It is in this vein that DFID has been praised for its 
ability to decentralize staff and financial authority to field-level in a way that 
supports the Paris principles, allowing it to be the first to act in many cases 
even when other donors pulled out, for examples in Zimbabwe where DFID 
continued its work during the crisis phase (OECD, 2010).   Nevertheless, as 
                                                        
11 For example, by permitting budgetary commitments to extend beyond the three-year 
budget cycle in the UK, or by embracing a more encompassing understanding of “value” in 
National Audit Office reports. 
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Whitehall concerns about value for money, efficiency and impact make 
themselves felt (Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 2011), the 
boundaries delineating acceptable risk/reward ratio are in flux.  For example, 
current Secretary of State for International Development Justine Greening is 
said to be reviewing the authority of Heads of Office to commit to spending 
downwards from GBP 20 million (Groves, 2013).  The professional discretion 
that was once a trademark of DFID’s excellence as a bilateral donor appears 
to be increasingly under threat.   
In Norway, the privilege of a healthy budgetary position that translates 
into large levels of aid to be spent and a trusting Scandinavian sensibility 
appears to have fostered almost unlimited discretion with limited concern for 
the potential costs of discretion. These costs include dispersion of priorities, 
aid fragmentation, the subtle politicization of the aid program and reduced 
concern for both impact and efficiency.   Meanwhile, in Canada,  ‘pathological’ 
risk aversion in CIDA limits scope for professional discretion (Government of 
Canada, 2007: 91).  The agency’s predilection for “accountancy” rather than 
“accountability” has minimized opportunities to internally experiment, learn, 
imagine and innovate (Brown and Jackson, 2009).   The fear of bad press and 
diminishing public and inter-governmental support sustain a general mistrust 
of CIDA bureaucrats and limited scope for bureaucratic initiative and agency.  
Instead, CIDA professionals grapple with the demands of complex 
organisational processes, crosscutting rules and excessive monitoring and 
reporting procedures driven mainly by compliance related concerns.   There is 
no financial authority provided to field-based staff to react swiftly to emerging 
issues as approvals from Ottawa are required for all new spending (OECD, 
2009b: 13).   As opportunities for bounded discretion dwindle, so too do 
prospects for CIDA achieving its aid effectiveness targets.   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Examining the four organisational dimensions of these three donors 
 27 
reveals some important mechanisms of donor effectiveness and highlights the 
value of linking organisational attributes and aid effectiveness goals.  A 
holistic assessment of these three cases suggests that a spectrum of donor 
effectiveness exists, one where the UK may be assessed as a more committed 
donor than Norway, while Norway itself achieves a superior result than 
Canada (Table 3).   While this broadly corresponds to their respective 
positions within existing quantitative rankings of donor performance, 
assessments of donor effectiveness of the kind presented here paint a more 
nuanced analysis of donor organisational dynamics and allows for closer 
analysis of similarities and difference.    
5. Embracing donor effectiveness: the road ahead 
 
Organisational factors within donor agencies matter for aid 
effectiveness.  This is the foundational assumption from which this call for 
greater understanding of the causal mechanisms of donor effectiveness 
emanates.  Donor effectiveness is the missing piece of the aid effectiveness 
puzzle, one that the Phase II Evaluation Report of the Paris Declaration has 
recognized in no uncertain terms when it states “it is urgent that all donor 
governments find ways to overcome the internal institutional or administrative 
obstacles slowing their aid reforms” (Wood et al., 2011: xv).  This paper has 
made some attempt to develop an analytical framework for understanding 
these obstacles by analytically defining the term donor effectiveness in terms 
of organisational categories and presenting the causal mechanisms that link 
organisational dynamics to the PD using case analysis from Canada, Norway 
and the UK.   
 
Although this article offers potential causal mechanisms of donor 
effectiveness, this should not be taken as offering a new managerial template 
for donor reform that can solve all the ills with aid.  Rather, the article 
underlines the value of certain strands of enquiry in the aid effectiveness 
debate, ones that highlights greater understanding of complex organisational 
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phenomena inside donor agencies.   The concept of donor effectiveness 
offers guidance for designing and reforming donor agencies against a 
backdrop where political environments, governance structures, organisational 
goals, and discretion incentives are contestable and contingent, where 
interaction effects are uncertain and where causal pathways are non-linear 
(Gulrajani, 2010b, Gulrajani, 2011).  Post-Busan however, there is a danger 
that even minimalist obligations to donor effectiveness are diluted as 
Southern donors ask to be exempt from them12 and Northern donors in their 
anxiousness to welcome Southern partners into a global framework temper 
their own ambitions for aid effectiveness. New ways need to be found to 
engage non-DAC actors in a dialogue about the organisational factor within 
their own development machinery.      
Notwithstanding the complexity of the aid landscape, it is important 
not to lose sight of donor effectiveness as an achievable, if long-tem, goal.   
There is urgency to understanding the experience of more established donors 
and to set a minimum standard of organisational behavior against which all 
donors must adhere.  While doing this is not without its challenges, ways 
need to be found to push the global aid effectiveness paradigm to be both a 
matter of aspiration and pragmatism.  Ultimately, a new generation of aid 
effectiveness policies that ignores donor effectiveness risks leaving donors, 
once again, as the weakest link.  
 
                                                        
12 The 2011 Busan Partnership Document is meant to apply to Southern donors on a 
voluntary basis (Bergamaschi, 2011).   
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Table 1. Aid effectiveness principles in relation to donor commitments and targets 
Source: Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) 
 Ownership Alignment 
 
Harmonisation 
 
Managing for 
results 
 
Mutual 
accountability 
 
D
e
fin
itio
n
 
Partner countries 
exercise effective 
leadership over their 
development policies 
and strategies and co-
ordinate development 
actions. 
Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national 
development strategies, institutions and procedures. 
Donors’ actions are more harmonised, 
transparent and collectively effective. 
 
Managing resources 
and improving 
decision-making for 
results 
Donors and partners are 
accountable for development 
results 
D
o
n
o
r 
c
o
m
m
itm
e
n
ts
 
Donors commit to 
respect partner 
country leadership and 
help strengthen their 
capacity to exercise it. 
Donors base their overall support— country strategies, policy dialogues, 
development co-operation programmes – on partners’ national 
development strategies. 
 
Donors use strengthened country systems (public financial management, 
accounting, auditing, procurement, results frameworks and monitoring) 
 
Where use of country systems is not feasible, establish additional 
safeguards that strengthen country systems. 
Donors implement common 
arrangements at country level to reduce 
duplication 
 
Donors respect their comparative 
advantage at country level 
 
Donors and partners reform procedures 
and strengthen staff incentives--for 
recruitment, appraisal and training –to 
work towards harmonisation, alignment 
and results. 
Donors link country 
programming and 
resources to results 
Donors commit to provide 
timely, transparent and 
comprehensive information on 
aid flows so as to enable partner 
authorities to report to their 
legislatures and citizens 
Donors and partners assess 
mutual progress in implementing 
agreed aid effectiveness 
commitments  
D
o
n
o
r ta
rg
e
ts
 
N/A Halve the proportion of aid flows not reported on government’s 
budget(s) (with at least 85% reported on budget) (Indicator 3) 
50% of technical co-operation flows are implemented through co-
ordinated programmes consistent with national strategies (Indicator 4) 
A 2/3 reduction in the % of aid not using partner countries’ PFM systems 
(Indicator 5a) 
A 2/3 reduction in the % of aid not using partner countries’ procurement 
systems (Indicator 5b) 
Reduce by 2/3 the stock of parallel project implementation units (PIUs). 
(Indicator 6) 
Halve the proportion of aid not disbursed within the scheduled fiscal 
year(Indicator 7) 
Continued progress untying aid (no target, Indicator 8) 
66% aid flows provided in common 
arrangements (Indicator 9) 
40% of missions to the field are joint 
(Indicator 10a) 
66% of analytical work is joint (Indicator 
10b) 
N/A N/A 
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Table 2.  Donor organisational factors: a cross-disciplinary summary 
 
 
Discipline Donor organisational 
dimension 
Definition 
 
International 
Political Economy 
 
Political environments 
 
Dynamics in the external setting, 
particularly those occurring at the 
interface of domestic and global 
politics 
 
Neo institutional 
economics 
 
Donor governance structures 
 
Formal institutional arrangements 
that ensure that donor 
organisations are acting in line with 
their principals located in the donor 
nation 
 
Sociology 
 
Organisational goals 
 
Specific purposes of an organisation 
 
Anthropology 
 
Discretion incentives 
 
Inducements for decision-making 
autonomy  
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Table 3. Causal mechanisms of donor effectiveness: comparing three 
bilateral donors  
 
 
Organisational environments  Norway UK Canada 
Political commitment is a causal mechanism for 
aid effectiveness. 
 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
Low 
Donor governance     
A powerfully mandated ministry of development 
that integrates both development policy and aid 
administration functions can improve aid 
effectiveness. 
 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
Low 
Organisational goals  
 
 
A high-level statement that is clear and 
unambiguous on the purpose of development can 
enhance aid effectiveness. 
 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
Discretion incentives 
 
 
Bounded professional discretion can improve aid 
effectiveness.    
 
 
Low 
 
Medium 
 
Low 
Sources: Mechanisms and ratings based on researcher observations and analysis 
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